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Abstract 
In this paper, we present a game theoretic model in which one manufacturer and its suppliers are coordinated. Quality levels of 
products from suppliers are considered. Due to fluctuation of demand resulting from varying quality levels, manufacturers are 
subject to demand-side risks. The objective of the research is to help decision making between manufacturers and suppliers in order 
to improve level of quality. Stackelberg game is applied to coordinate the manufacturer and suppliers Then, Pareto efficient 
solutions are utilized to generate supplier’s optimal response functions. Computational experiments are conducted to demonstrate 
the effectiveness of the proposed method. 
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1. Introduction 
Today’s global economy has a growing impact on the 
economic futures of companies. Many companies in the 
global business environment are facing fierce 
competition on price and quality simultaneously. 
Customers make their decisions to purchase the product 
from firms based on both its price and quality [1]. In 
order to survive in global competition, companies are 
embracing global integration and coordination of supply 
chain planning.  In this paper, we propose a game 
theoretic approach to coordinate manufacturers and 
suppliers in order to improve quality of products. The 
model proposed in this paper aims to help decision 
making between manufacturers and suppliers in order to 
improve level of quality. 
Nowadays, outsourcing suppliers to countries such as 
China or India has become popular. Companies establish 
their factories globally to decrease cost. It is a fact that 
those countries can provide lower manufacturing cost. 
However, in order to win in global business, competition 
is shifting from price to quality in many industries in 
order to achieve high customer satisfaction [2]. Our 
work is motivated to help decision making of global 
manufacturing planning in order to achieve high 
customer satisfaction with low costs. Quality levels of 
those low-cost countries are varying. Meanwhile, the 
manufacturer is also facing the challenge of archiving 
high customer satisfaction in order to optimize profits.  
In our paper, we try to coordinate manufacturers and 
suppliers in order improve quality. In addition, 
competition among suppliers is also considered. It is a 
reality that the existence of competition is one of main 
drives to improve quality for companies. In practice, 
demand is always influenced by quality of products and 
price. Therefore, we assume that demand from 
customers is decided by quality levels of products which 
are purchased from suppliers.  
This paper considers one manufacturer and its 
suppliers who are involved in purchasing, producing and 
selling products. Suppliers determine prices of products 
which are purchased by the manufacturer. The purchased 
quantity is decided by the manufacturer. Suppliers try to 
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improve the level of quality of products in order to 
increase demand from customers. The increase of 
demand stimulates the manufacturer to purchase more 
products from suppliers. The relationship is modeled by 
noncooperative game that the manufacturer as a leader 
and the supplier as a follower. The manufacturer 
determines production and purchased quantity based on 
primary demand. The primary demand function is linear 
in quality and price [3]. Quality levels and prices are 
determined by suppliers after the manufacturer’s action.  
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
briefly summarizes relevant literatures. The problem 
description and notations are presented in Section 3. We 
formulate the problem as a game theoretic model in 
Section 4. The analysis of the equilibrium is provided in 
Section 5. We propose a method to find the equilibrium 
in this section.  Numerical examples are shown in 
Section 6. Finally, the paper concludes in section 7 with 
the expectation of the future work. 
2.  Literature review 
Increased competition is the primary reason to draw 
intensive attention on quality today. The quality problem 
associating with defects from suppliers or in the 
production process is widely investigated. Franca et al. 
[4] introduces a method to evaluate the risk of poor 
quality. Defects are minimized to improve the Sigma 
quality level. Hsieh and Liu [5] establish game models in 
a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one 
supplier, both having imperfect production and 
inspection processes. They investigate the supplier’s and 
the manufacturer’s quality investment and inspection 
strategies with different degrees of information revealed. 
Perfect and imperfect quality items are considered in an 
integrated production-inventory model by Sana [6].  A 
cost-effective production and distribution system is 
established to improve response to customers as well as 
quality of products.  
In our paper we consider the impact of quality on 
demand from customers. We assume that demand 
depends on quality and price of products which are 
purchased from suppliers. In 1998, Banker et al. [1] 
studies the impact of various factors on quality in 
different competitive environments. Xie et al. [7] also 
introduces a model which considers quality in competing 
supply chains. Both of them assume that demand is 
influenced by quality levels of products. We also involve 
this consideration in our proposed model. However, we 
extend the model to consider non-cooperative game in 
order to coordinate the manufacturer and suppliers.  
We focus on designing global manufacturing 
planning in this paper. Nishi et al. [8] proposes a novel 
distributed optimization system consisting of a material 
requirement planning subsystem, a distribution planning 
subsystem and decentralized scheduling subsystems for 
multi-stage production process. Afterwards, an 
augmented Lagrangian approach is introduced to 
optimize distributed supply chain planning [9]. 
Coordination is a key factor to achieve global supply 
chain planning. Many researchers devote their effort to 
developing an efficient approach to coordinate supply 
chain planning. A quantity discount policy to coordinate 
the manufacturer and suppliers under demand 
uncertainty is addressed [10]. A contract decision 
considering quantity discount policy is studied in a game 
theoretic model [11].  
Game theoretic approaches are widely studied to 
resolve the coordination of channel partners along 
supply chain. Esmaseili et al. [12] proposes the seller-
buyer coordination model by non-cooperative and 
cooperative game theory where the unit marketing 
expenditure and the unit price charged by the buyer 
influence the demand of products. A multiple-suppliers 
and single manufacturer assembly supply chain is 
investigated by Leng and Parlar [13]. The suppliers 
produce components which are assembled by the 
manufacturer. They discuss the decentralized assembly 
supply chain to find Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium, 
and coordinate it by the cost-sharing contracts. We 
propose a game theoretic model to find an equilibrium 
that the manufacturer and suppliers obtain individual 
maximum profits as well as the optimal quality levels. 
Due to varying quality levels and prices of products 
from supplier, the manufacturing faces financial risks 
resulting from unexpected fluctuation of demand. Thus, 
the risk consideration is involved in our formulation. 
Nagurney et al. [14][15] introduces supernetworks in 
which supply-side and demand-side risk are included. 
In summary, in our paper we build a game theoretic 
model to coordinate the manufacturer and the suppliers 
in order to improve quality of products. The objective of 
this paper is to offer an optimal decision making of 
global manufacturing planning in today’s competitive 
business environment.  
3. Problem description and notation 
In our model, we consider one manufacturer and its 
outsourcing supplier ),..,1( Iii  . The manufacturer 
purchases parts of products from outsourcing suppliers 
from different countries, such as China, India or Brazil. 
Then, the manufacturer produces finished products in 
order to satisfy demand from regional customers. The 
demand depends on quality levels of products from 
suppliers. We assume that inventory is not allowed for 
the manufacturer. We formulate the problem as a game 
theoretic model where the manufacturer determines 
purchased quantity of products and suppliers determine 
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prices of products. The global manufacturing model is 
illustrated in Fig. 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Global manufacturing model 
 
Sets: 
I : set of suppliers 
 
Parameters: 
a : potential intrinsic demand 
b : inventory cost 
e : production cost 
2
ixf ) : fixed cost function which is increasing and 
convex in the quality level ix  
ik : share of the intrinsic demand potential for  supplier 
i  
Q : production capacity 
r : retailer price 
iv : cost of products for supplier  i  H : quality related variable cost P : competition intensity denoting the competitive     
effects of quality 
O : demand sensitivity of price i  
m : the total profit of the manufacturer 
s : the profit of the supplier  
 
Decision variables: 
id : purchased quantity of products from supplier 
iq : demand from customers purchased from supplier i  
iw : wholesale price from supplier i  
i  
ix : quality provided by the supplier i  
iy : production quantity of products for the 
manufacturer purchased from supplier i  
4. The model 
As we state before, we assume that demand from 
customers depends on the levels of quality. We assume 
two suppliers labeled i and ),2,1,( jijij z  
compete each other. They provide the same product with 
different prices and quality to the manufacturer.    
Extending the demand function proposed by Xie et al.  
[7], the primary demand function for supplier i  is linear 
in quality and price. 
)()( jiiii xxwakxq  PO  (1) 
where 12   kki . aki represents the intrinsic demand 
potential for supplier i . We consider the competition 
between suppliers. In order to gain more demand, 
suppliers should improve quality and reduce price. 
Therefore, P is competition intensity denoting the 
competitive effects of quality. According to quality 
improvement strategy, the primary demand function 
iq should has a positive correlation with its supplier’s 
quality, that is, 0!P . Once supplier i improves its 
quality, the demand is affected more than its competitor. 
This policy encourages suppliers to improve quality to 
compete in order to gain more demand. 
Similar to other studies [1] [7], the cost function for 
supplier i  is given by 
2)( iiiii xfqxvc ) H  (2) 
 
where 2ixf ) is a fixed cost function for supplier 
i which is increasing and convex in the quality level 
ix [16].
2
ix)  is the marginal cost for the supplier in the 
quality level ix . In this paper, we consider global 
manufacturing. Thus, for competing suppliers from 
different countries, they could have different price of 
prices iv and price of investment in quality ix . 
4.1. Formulation 
Due to demand from customers depending on quality 
levels of products provided by suppliers, manufacturers 
may have risk to have inventory. We assume that 
production is always more than demand. The 
manufacturer’s total profit is the sales revenue while 
minus production cost, inventory cost and procurement 
cost.  
 
Manufacturer: 
 
})({ iiiii
l i
im wdbqyeyrq   ¦¦  (3) 
supplier 
i=1,..,I 
manufacturer 
product demand 
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Subject to 
(1) According to previous assumption, production is 
always more than demand 
ii qy t    (4) 
(2) Production capacity 
Qy
i
d¦    (5) 
 (3) Cost function 
)()( jiii xxakxq  P   (6) 
(4) Production constraint 
ii yd     (7) 
 
Suppliers negotiate with the manufacturer based on 
quantity discount. Then, suppliers’ profit comes from the 
purchased products from the manufacturer. The 
supplier’s total profit is the sales revenue from the 
manufacturer minus cost. 
 
Supplier 
2)( iiiiiis xfqxvdw )  H  (8) 
  
Subject to 
(1) Wholesale price should be larger than cost of 
product. 
ii vw t    (9) 
 
We apply Stackelberg game to this problem where 
the manufacturer is a leader and suppliers are followers. 
We also consider competition between supplier i and 
supplier j ( 2,1 z ji ) in this problem. The 
equilibrium of Stackelberg game is usually solved by a 
backward induction procedure. It generally works as 
follows. The follower’s (supplier) problem must be first 
solved to get the reaction function of the leader’s 
(manufacturer) decision results. The manufacturer’s 
decision problem is solved considering all possible 
reactions of its followers for maximizing the profits. We 
consider suppliers’ competition in this model. Therefore, 
there are two ways to derive optimal response functions. 
One is to derive the optimal response functions by 
minimizing the total sum of objective functions. The 
second one is to derive each supplier’s objective 
function separately. Then, we find the equilibrium from 
the optimal response functions. In this paper, we 
consider the first way to obtain the optimal response 
functions. Therefore, the allocation of profits is applied 
in this work. We introduce Pareto efficient solutions to 
resolve competition between suppliers. In this work, we 
assume that two suppliers make decisions 
simultaneously.  
The Pareto efficient solutions can be characterized by 
maximizing: 
10,)1( dd33 TTT jiZ          (10) 
Therefore, 
 
Objective function of total profit for suppliers: 
})(){1(
})({
2
2
jjjjjj
iiiiii
xfqxvdw
xfqxvdwZ
)
) 
HT
HT
 
                                                                                    (11) 
 
4.2.  Supplier’s optimal response function 
In order to obtain the optimal solution, we firstly 
derive supplier’s optimal response functions. We 
differentiate Eq. (11) with respect to ix  and 
jx .Considering the first derivative of supplier’s profit 
function with respect to ix , we have 
 
)()1(]2
)()}({[
jji
iijiii
i
xvx
xvxxwak
x
Z
HPT
HPPOHT
)
 w
w
 
                                                                                   (12) 
Since 0)22(2
2
) w THP
i
s
x
Z
, the profit function 
is strictly concave with respect to ix . Then, by solving 
the equation 0 w
w
ix
Z
, we can obtain the critical point of 
the equation with an increasing and concave function. 
 
Let 0 w
w
ix
Z
 , the critical point of the optimal solution 
for the supplier can be derived as  
 
)
 TTHP
HPTPOTH
22
)()()(* jjjiii
i
xvvvwak
x
(13) 
 
In the same way, we differentiate Eq. (11) with respect 
to jx  and let 0 w
w
jx
Z
 
)1(2)1(2
)()()()1(
*
TTHP
HPTPOHT
)

 
ijjijj
j
xvvvwak
x
 
                                                                                    (14) 
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5. Analysis of the Stackelberg game equilibrium   
The relationship between the manufacturer and 
suppliers is modeled by non-cooperative game. The non-
cooperative game model is based on the Stackelberg 
strategy solution with the manufacturers as a leader and 
suppliers as followers. The manufacturer determines 
production planning and decides purchased quantity of 
products from suppliers firstly in order to satisfy 
demands. Suppliers follow manufacturer’s decision to 
determine wholesale prices and levels of quality. 
 
5.1. Solution approach 
In Section 4.2, we try to solve the supplier’s optimal 
pricing response decision firstly. Analytically, we can 
find the relationship of wholesale price and level of 
quality for each supplier by the supplier’ model. With 
given wholesale prices of products for each supplier, if 
quality level for each supplier can satisfy Eq. (13) and 
Eq. (14) simultaneously, we can say that they are 
optimal ix and jx . Therefore, we can obtain the 
following equation by substituting Eq. (14) into Eq. (13) 
 
HTT
HP
HTT
TH
HTT
TOH
HTT
TP
HTT
TTTTOH





 
)1()1(
)1(
)1()(
)1(
)1(
)1(
)1()1)((
22
2
2
2
2
*
A
v
A
B
BBA
Awak
A
Av
A
Bwakx
j
jjj
ii
i
 
                                                                                    (15) 
where ) 22HPA , )( ji vvB  P  
 
5.2. Solution algorithm 
The proposed algorithm consists of the following 
steps. 
 
Step 0: Initialize parameters of the manufacturer’s and 
retailer’s model 
Step 1: Derive retailer’s best response function  
Step 2: Initialize iw and jw and derive optimal 
*
ix and *
jx by substituting the given iw and jw  
Step 3: Solve function m3  by substituting *ix , *
jx , iw and jw and generate optimal solutions. 
  
6. Numerical example 
This section presents the numerical example which is 
aimed at illustrating the features of the proposed models 
and demonstrating the performance of the algorithm. We 
set there are two suppliers and one manufacturer in the 
model. . In the computational experiment, GAMS Rev is 
used. Parameters used in the computational example are 
shown in Table 1 for the manufacturer and suppliers. 
Table 2 shows the result of this computational example.  
We conduct small size problems to demonstrate the 
features of the model. Two computational results are 
obtained while prices of products offered by two 
suppliers are different. We can notice that when the price 
is increased, suppliers must improve both of their quality 
in order to compete. The total profit of the manufacturer 
is not increased in the case, because the demand also 
depends on the price of the products. Thus, the 
manufacturer and suppliers should try to optimize 
quality of products as well as the price in order to obtain  
 
Table 1. Parameters  
 
manufacturer  supplier  
r  20 
iv  2 
e  3 
jv  3 
b  1 f  1 
Q  50 )  1 
a  20 H  1 
ik  0.5   P  2   
O  1   
 
 
Table 2. Computational result for case study 
 
example 1  example 2  
iw  2 iw  4 
ix  7 ix  8.091 
jx  3 jx  3.455 
y  16 y  17.273 
Total profit 
for the 
manufacturer 
208 Total profit 
for the 
manufacturer 
182.545 
 
more profits in this game theoretic model. In the next 
step, we examine more detailed impact of different 
parameters. 
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7. Conclusion and future work 
This paper has formulated a global manufacturing 
planning problem associating with quality considerations 
as a Stackelberg game model. We consider that demand 
from customers is linear in quality of products from 
suppliers and wholesale prices. Our primary interest is to 
involve competition between suppliers in this game 
theoretic model. Nowadays, in order to gain demand and 
increase profits, global suppliers have to compete in 
price and quality. We analyze this problem as 
Stackelberg game where the manufacturer is a leader and 
the supplier is a follower. It is assumed that two supplier 
make their decisions simultaneously. The computational 
examples are conducted to illustrate the effectiveness of 
the proposed method and also impact of price and 
quality in this game theoretic model. In the future, it is 
very interesting to consider the situation that suppliers 
do not make decisions simultaneously. We consider each 
supplier’s response function separately, and find 
equilibrium. In the presented model, we only consider 
that demand from customers is influenced by quality 
which is provided by suppliers. The demand is linear in 
quality and price which are determined by suppliers 
through competition. Therefore, the manufacturer may 
face the financial risk to satisfy demand. So, we did not 
involve the direct consideration of demand uncertainty 
and risk directly in the presented model. In the future 
research, we will involve the local markets in the model. 
And, for retailers the demand from customers is 
uncertainty. Meanwhile, the manufacturer should 
compensate once any uncertain accident occurs subject 
to the delivery to retailers. 
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